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Fair Use on the Internet: A Fine Line
Between Fair and Foul*
By KEVIN DAvIs**
To SAY THAT technology has pervaded nearly all facets of American
society and culture is a truism.1 As the Internet has grown and
changed, so too have the various legal issues surrounding it.2 The fo-
cus of this comment is an examination of just one of these issues-the
relationship between the Internet and copyright law. More specifi-
cally, the focus will be on copyright infringement that occurs on the
Internet, and how the "fair use" doctrine may provide a defense to
infringement.3 While there is a general dearth of case law involving
copyright infringement on the Internet, the biggest gap involves in-
fringement by private users. 4 Therefore, this comment explores the
few cases that do exist and predicts how future cases involving in-
fringement by private users on the Internet may be decided. Although
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John T. Soma for lending his insight and expertise to this comment; and to the staff of the
U.S.F. Law Review for their phenomenal work. Most important, this comment is dedicated
to my wife Lisa, whose patience, support, and technical expertise made this comment
possible.
1. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47
DuKE LJ. 87, 87 (1997) (stating that the claim that we are in the "information age" is such
a clichE that it does not require footnote support).
2. For a historical perspective on the changes in the Internet, see Adam Druckman,
Back in the Digital Dawn (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http://www.metrotimes.com/19/16/Col-
umns/netroplis.html>.
3. The issue of fair use has acquired a reputation as "the most troublesome in the
whole law of copyright . . . ." Dellar v. Goldwyn, 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). As
recently as 1984 at least one Justice called this reputation partially justified. See Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
4. For cases involving liability of Internet Service Providers, see Marobie-FL, Inc. v.
National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Dist., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). For
cases involving liability of Bulletin Board Services, see Sega Enters. LTD v. Maphia, 948 F.
Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla.
1993).
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the argument can be made that a copyright holder has little to no
financial incentive to sue a judgment-proof individual, this comment
takes the position that it is imperative for both savvy and novice users
to have an understanding of the possible ramifications and legal con-
sequences of their actions.
The most significant reason there is little case law dealing with
infringement by private users is because private users are hard to track
and find. However, there is little dispute that copyright infringement
is pervasive on the Internet. It is likely that as privacy on the Internet
diminishes, it will become easier to identify individuals that, for exam-
ple, download pirated software or duplicate and distribute copy-
righted images. New technologies, such as the Pentium III chip,5 will
make it easier to track and identify copyright infringement. Addition-
ally, as faster modems and better Internet connections decrease the
time it takes to download a file, it is likely that the rate of infringe-
ment will increase.
Part I of this comment sets out the background structure of the
Internet and examines why the Internet poses unique legal issues per-
taining to copyright infringement. Part II provides a brief background
of copyright law and sets out the fair use defense. Part III looks at
different mediums, discusses how copyright protection applies to each
medium when it is available on the Internet, and examines how fair
use might apply. Part IV looks at governmental initiatives involving
copyright law and the Internet and discusses issues that may be rele-
vant in the future.
I. Structure of the Internet
The technical aspects of the Internet have been well documented
and therefore will not be discussed in detail. 6 The technical founda-
5. Intel's Pentium III chip was developed with an embedded 96 digit code that iden-
tifies the user. Intel claims the chip was developed in order to increase the security of
online transactions. After public disapproval, the company agreed to produce a new chip
with the code in a default "off" position. However, early reports indicate (to no surprise)
that it is possible for a web site to activate the switch without the user's knowledge. See
Charles Piller, Security law in Intel Chip, Magazine Says, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 2, 1999, at
C3; Idenification Inside, COMPUTER SHOPPER FROM ZDWnRE, June 1, 1999, available in 1999
WL 12875453; see also Ephraim Schwartz & Dan Briody, Intel's Pentium Security Woes Continue
(Mar. 10, 1999) <http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayStory.pl?990310.wcpsn.htm>;
Protect Your PC's Privacy (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://www.bigbrotherinside.com/>.
6. For the novice interested in learning more, Supreme Court and Circuit Court
decisions involving the Internet provide relevant, clear, and succinct explanations of the
technical issues. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-861 (1997); Micro Star v.
Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109-11 (9th Cir. 1998).
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tion of the Internet is not important for purposes of this comment; it
is the way in which the Internet is used that is relevant.7 The capabili-
ties of the Internet raise new issues involving copyright infringement
because anything that can be digitized-such as text (including com-
puter programs), images, movies, or music-can be placed on a web
site and then copied from the site. Furthermore, copies of text,
images, movies, or music downloaded from the Internet do not depre-
ciate qualitatively.
There are generally two ways a copyrighted work is placed on the
Internet. First, the author may upload data with the intention of dis-
seminating it to a broad audience. This is a growing trend, for exam-
ple, for independent or unsigned musicians without record contracts
and without the ability to reach a broad audience.8 Second, a user
may upload a copyrighted work to a web site in order to make it avail-
able free of charge. 9
There is a great struggle involving freedom on the Internet. Be-
cause of the lack of regulation-and in spite of the attempts by some
to regulate-the Internet encompasses a broad range of expression
and conduct. Although some informal rules (sometimes called "neti-
quette") exist,1 0 many users view the Internet as the last bastion of
freedom. This freedom encompasses, for example, freedom of
speech1 1 and freedom of expression. 12 This freedom is relevant to
7. For an overview of the development of the Internet, see Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes'
Internet Timeline v4.1 (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Internet/
History/HIT.html>.
8. See, e.g., Online Bands (visited Apr. 10, 1999) <http://www.onlinebands.com/>.
Currently, some search engines cannot distinguish between legitimate sites and those that
offer pirated recordings. See Andrea Orr, Lycos to Offer Online Music Search, (visited Aug. 17,
1999) <http://www.cnn.co.uk/US/9902/01/BC-INTERNET-LYCOS.reut/>.
9. With the lesson of Larry C. Matthews fresh in mind, this comment will not attempt
to demonstrate any illegal Internet activities. Matthews, a broadcast journalist for over
thirty years, was recently sentenced to one and a half years in federal prison for trading
child pornography over the Internet. Matthews claimed he was conducting research for a
story. See U.S. v. Matthews, 11 F. Supp. 2d 656, 658 (D. Md. 1998); Craig Whitlock, Reporter
Gets 1 1/2 Years for Child Pornography; Newsman Said He Was Working on Story, WASH. POST,
Mar. 9, 1999, at B4.
10. For example, sending unsolicited e-mail (also called "spam") or typing in all CAPI-
TAL letters (because it connotes shouting) are strongly discouraged and, in the case of
spam, sometimes prohibited by Internet Service Providers and e-mail providers. See Online
Support (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/mail/spam/
>SpaminatorTM (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://www.mindspring.net/aact-mgmt/
spam.html>; Hotmail Information, (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://lc4.law5.hotmail.passport.
com/cgi-bin/dasp/hminfo-shell.asp?_lang=&beta=&content=faq#q20>.
11. The campaign for free speech on the Internet is the Blue Ribbon Campaign. See
Blue Ribbon Free Speech Campaign (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.csd.uwo.ca/-jamie/
blue-ribbon.html>; see also Cyberspace Independence Declaration (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http:/
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copyright in that some view content on the Internet as speech or ex-
pression and argue that content on the Internet cannot (or at least
should not) be regulated. 13 In other words, duplicating and sending
files on the Internet implicates First Amendment protection and must
be intensely guarded.
A. Novel Issues
Over time, copyright law has changed with technology. The first
copyright laws were enacted in response to the technological break-
through of the printing press. Since then, Congress has modified
copyright laws several times, each time with the intent of furthering
the underlying goal of copyright protection.1 4 Courts are generally
deferential to Congress and have refused to unilaterally broaden pro-
tections in response to technological change.
It is fair to say the Internet is the most significant technological
advance in relation to copyright law since the printing press. There
are several reasons for this pronouncement. The first is the ease and
convenience by which material on the Internet can be duplicated.
While the camera, photocopier, and videocassette recorder have all
impacted copyright law over the last hundred years, no other medium
allows for duplication and distribution of nearly any kind of copy-
righted material. This has prompted changes in the behavior of copy-
right holders. While some have gone to great lengths to protect
/www.ottoprint.com/cybdeclindep.htm>; cf The Green Ribbon Campaign for Responsibility in
Free Speech (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.Zondervan.com/green.htm>. The Green
Ribbon site is sponsored by the self-proclaimed "world's leading Christian publisher," who
believes that some use of the First Amendment is a "smoke screen to communicate in a
vulgar, profane, violent, and insulting manner." The site's sponsors believe that "the true
right of free speech is accurately carried out when self-restraint is responsibly exercised."
Id.
12. See, e.g., Online Freedom Federation (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.off-hq.org/
>. A recent episode involving 3Com Corporation is illustrative. 3Com ran ads featuring a
naked woman holding its Palm V organizer so that it discretely covered her breasts. The tag
line read "Simply Palm." A Web designer posted a spoof with a similar photo product,
featuring a naked woman, and the tag line "Simply Porn." SeeJ. McHugh., Mirror, mirror!,
FoRaES, May 3, 1999, at 54. The parody was originally posted at <http://www.Osil8.com/>.
After a threat from 3Com's legal staff, the pictures were removed, but as is the nature of
the Internet, the site now contains links to a multitude of other sites that have posted
copies of the original spoof. See Osils Thwarted by the Man (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://
www.Osil8.com/episodes/99/03/29/index.html>.
13. The most extreme of these movements essentially advocates what this comment
calls the "fair game" defense, which believes that copyright currently does not apply to the
Internet and anything that is found there may be used without limitation.
14. These goals are, first, to benefit society and, second, to benefit the copyright
owner. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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copyrighted materials from the Internet, 15 others have realized the
futility in controlling private use and have relinquished distribution
control in hope that users will avoid commercial activity. 16 A second
unique aspect of copyright infringement on the Internet is the scope
of liability. The Internet has the potential to implicate everyone who
comes into contact with the copyrighted material. Under certain cir-
cumstances, liability for direct, contributory or vicarious infringement
may be imposed upon the individual that posts the infringing mate-
rial, the uploader and downloader of the infringing material, the ad-
ministrator of the site, and the Internet Service Provider ("ISP"). This
broad liability might arise because the user does not merely possess
the downloaded or uploaded material, but also makes a copy of it. For
example, an individual may purchase a bootlegged copy of a CD or
movie on the street. By simply possessing the infringing material, it is
unlikely the purchaser is liable for copyright infringement. However,
when that same individual uploads or downloads the same CD or
movie, a copy has been made, and therefore the person has satisfied
at least one element of copyright infringement.17
B. Has a "Copy" Been Made?
When data is transmitted over the Internet it is broken into differ-
ent pieces and reassembled at its destination. This routing technique
insures that data will get from point A to point B because if one route
is blocked or disabled, the piece attempting to use a blocked route
will automatically be rerouted through a different path.' 8 At each step
along the way, the computer makes a temporary copy of the piece of
data. This has led to the argument that every copyrighted work sent
15. See Richard Morrison, The Rights that Don't Smell Quite Right, THE LONDON TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1998, at 41 (suggesting that the recent extension of copyright protection in the
United States for movies before they enter the public domain may have been motivated by
what was to have been the expiration in 2003 of the cartoon Steamboat Willie, where
Mickey Mouse made his first appearance). Disney's protection over Mickey Mouse is evi-
dent by the fact that the cartoon character appears in a limited and discrete manner on
Disney's web site. This has not, however, stopped other sites from using the image. See, e.g.,
Walt Disney His Life and Works (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.intergraffix.com/walt/
options.htm>.
16. See Associated Press, Grateful Dead to Allow MP3 Trades (visited May 13, 1999)
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/style/features/daily/deadO5l3.htm>.
17. The elements of copyright infringement are (1) the owner holds a valid copyright
to the work and (2) the defendant copied the work. See Fiest Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citation omitted); MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAw § 9.2 (1989).
18. This function serves the Internet's original purpose, which was to serve as a means
of communication after a nuclear war. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997).
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over the Internet is copied and infringed along the way. Although re-
cent legislation seems to have settled the question by granting exemp-
tions for service providers for transitory communication, 19 there has
yet to be a case testing the scope of the exemptions, or an application
of the conditions required for the provider to earn an exemption.
II. Copyright
A. Infringement
Congress's authority to establish copyright protection is found in
the United States Constitution.20 Since originally enacted, copyright
law21 has been amended several times in order to adapt to changing
technologies. 22 Copyrights are intended to benefit both society and
the creator of the copyrighted material. The rationale for granting
copyright protection is that by giving the creator of a work a limited
monopoly23 over the rights of the work, individuals are encouraged to
create, which leads to societal benefits.24
As currently formulated, copyright law gives the copyright holder
exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, perform, prepare derivative
works, and display the copyrighted work. 25 Copyright infringement
19. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct.
28, 1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201). See infra notes 253-273 and accompanying text.
20. "The Congress shall have the power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
21. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994), originally Copyright Act of
1909, 35 Stat. 1705.
22. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984);
Paul D. Amrozowicz, When Law, Science and Technology Worlds Collide: Copyright Issues on the
Internet, 81 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 81, 84 (1999).
23. A topic of much debate involves the tension between the purpose of copyright
protection and the goals of antitrust law. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse
and the Limits of Intellectual Property Monopoly, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 4 (1998); Deborah
Tussey. Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in Primary Law, 9 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & Err. LJ. 173, 187 (1998).
24. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
25. Section 106 states:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this tide has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly;
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occurs when an individual uses, or authorizes the use of, the copy-
righted material in a way that trespasses into any of the copyright
holder's five exclusive rights. 26
The elements of copyright infringement are: (1) the owner holds
a valid copyright to the work; and (2) the defendant copied the
work.27 Furthermore, given the strict liability nature of copyright in-
fringement, an individual may violate the statute by downloading in-
formation even though she lacks knowledge that the material is
protected. 28
B. Fair Use
Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement 29 and
requires a court to weigh the four factors set forth in 17 U.S.C. section
107. These factors include the (1) purpose and character of the use;
(2) nature of the work; (3) amount copied; and (4) market effects.30
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994); Sony, 464 U.S. at 433.
27. See Fiest Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (cita-
tion omitted); MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYIGHT LAW § 9.2 (1989).
28. See David L. Hayes, Advanced Copyright Issues on the Internet, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
LJ. 1, 17 (1998); David N. Weiskopf, The Risks of Copyright Infringement on the Internet: A
Practitioner's Guide, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 6 (1998).
29. Section 107 states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
30. See id.
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Fair use is an "equitable rule of reason."3' While none of the four
factors is determinative, the fourth factor, effect on the market place,
is generally considered the most important.3 2 There are no "presump-
tive categories" of fair use.33 Given the nature of the doctrine, "each
case must be decided on its own facts." 34 Any bright-line rules are es-
chewed in favor of a case-by-case analysis. 35 "All factors are to be ex-
plored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of
copyright." 36
1. Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.37
a. Facts and Decision
The Supreme Court's decision in Sony is the starting point of
modern copyright and fair use case law. Universal brought suit against
Sony for copyright violation,38 claiming that Sony's manufacture and
sale of video tape recorders ("VTRs") to the public-which could then
be used to record broadcast television programs-constituted copy-
right infringement.39 The district court concluded that "noncommer-
cial home-use" of VTRs was a fair use and ruled for Sony on all
claims. 40 The court of appeal reversed, finding no fair use defense
because the use in question was not a "productive use." 41 The
Supreme Court found for Sony, holding that the sale of VTRs did not
constitute contributory infringement because: (1) Sony showed that
most copyright holders would not object to the show being recorded
31. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976)). Fair use
has also been defined as "a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent." Harper & Row, Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT
AND LITERACY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
32. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 566.
33. See id. at 561.
34. Id. at 560.
35. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
36. Campbell 510 U.S. at 578 (citations omitted).
37. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) [hereinafter Sony III].
38. See Sony IIl, 464 U.S. at 420.
39. See id. Universal claimed that Sony was liable for infringement by the consumer
because of Sony's marketing of the VTR's. See id.
40. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 469 (1979)
[hereinafter Sony 1].
41. The court of appeals stated that an example of "productive use" is " when copy-
righted material is reproduced for its intrinsic use." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Sony Il]. Sony was thus liable
for contributory infringement. See Sony III, 464 U.S. at 420.
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and viewed at a later time; 42 and (2) Universal failed to show that the
potential market or value of the copyrighted work would be harmed
in any significant way. 43
In its review of the district court's decision, the Supreme Court
noted that VTRs were being used for "time-shifting" 44 and that there
was no issue of a tape itself being used for prohibited purposes. 45 This
finding was key to the Court's fair use analysis. The Court concluded
that VTRs were being used for "noncommercial, nonprofit activity"
and therefore did not conflict with the purpose and character of the
use.4 6 With regard to market effects, the Court stated that when copy-
righted material was used for noncommercial reasons, in order to re-
cover, the party bringing the evidence must demonstrate a likelihood
of future harm to the copyrighted material's value. 47 There was no
evidence of past harm to Universal and the evidence of potential fu-
ture harm was "'speculative and, at best, minimal.' ' 48 The Court
briefly discussed the nature of the work and the amount copied, not-
ing that since the nature of television viewing is to invite the viewer to
watch the entire program for free, the fact that an entire program was
taped did not weigh against a finding of fair use.49
42. See Sony Il, 464 U.S. at 443. The district court heard testimony from several major
copyright holders who welcomed the use of time-shifting. The Supreme Court noted that
in an action for direct infringement such testimony would be irrelevant, but under contrib-
utory infringement, "the copyright holder may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks
affects only his programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an
interest in the outcome." Id.
43. See id. at 456. The dissent argued that the taping in question was an unproductive
use, and therefore not a fair use. Additionally, the dissent argued that while one person's
infringing taping may seem inconsequential, the total infringement caused by countless
tapings is a harm to the copyright holder that "must be prevented." Id. at 482 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). "When the use is one that creates no benefit to the public at large, copyright
protection should not be denied on the basis that a new technology that may result in
harm has not yet done so." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. Time-shifting occurs when an individual records a show to watch later. See id. at
421. The benefit of this practice to the television industry is that it "enlarges the television
viewing audience." Id.
45. See id at 425. Prohibited uses would have been "the transfer of tapes to other
persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for public performances, or the copying of pro-
grams transmitted on pay or cable television ... " Id.
46. Id at 449.
47. See id at 451.
48. Id. at 454 (quoting Sony I, 480 F. Supp. at 467).
49. See id. at 449-50.
Fall 19991
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
b. Analysis
While Sony did not deal with the Internet, the case is significant
from a technology standpoint for two reasons. First, the manner in
which a VTR is used to record a television program, and the way that
recording is then used, is analogous to downloading something from
the Internet to a disk. The Court's analysis involving noncommercial,
in-home use could easily be applied to a case of someone download-
ing a streamed signal from the Internet.50 Second, Sony provides in-
sight to the Court's approach to copyright issues involving "new"
technology.5 1 The Court stated that "[s] ound policy, as well as history,
supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technolog-
ical innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. '5 2
2. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises53
a. Facts and Decision
The Court's next significant foray into fair use occurred the term
following Sony. Harper & Row sued Nation Enterprises over its publi-
cation of excerpts from a book Harper & Row was about to publish. 54
The book at issue was former President Gerald Ford's memoirs. 55 One
week before publication, excerpts from the book were set to appear in
Time Magazine.5 6 Nation Enterprises obtained an unauthorized copy of
the manuscript and quickly published an article that quoted passages
from the manuscript. 57 The district court ruled for Harper & Row,
finding that Nation Enterprises' actions constituted copyright in-
fringement and that the actions were not justified under the fair use
doctrine. 58 The court of appeal reversed, finding Nation Enterprises'
50. See, e.g., TV on the Web (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.tvontheweb.com/>. Of
course, adult entertainment is at the forefront of streaming technology. See generally
Dollbaby's (visited Apr. 11, 1999) <http://www.dollsplace.com/>; Rah-Rahh!! (visited Apr.
11, 1999) <http://rahrah-site.com/>.
51. Although VTRs are certainly not "new" technology by today's standard, and will
likely go the way of the 8-track player once DVD players become more reasonably priced,
VTRs did constitute new technology at the time of this case.
52. Sony III, 464 U.S. at 431. The Court went on to say that "[i]t may well be that
Congress will take a fresh look at this new technology, just as it so often has examined
other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that have not yet been
written." Id. at 456.
53. 471 U.S. 539 (1985) [hereinafter Harper & Row III].
54. See Harper & Row Il, 471 U.S. at 542.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 543.
57. See id.
58. See 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1070-71 (S.D. N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter Harper & Row 1].
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publication of excerpts a valid form of fair use. 59 The Supreme Court
subsequently found for Harper & Row, rejecting Nation Enterprises'
fair use defense. 60
The Court applied each of the four factors to the facts of the case.
In its determination that the purpose and character of the use did not
warrant a finding of fair use, the Court focused on whether the ac-
tions of Nation Enterprises: (1) constituted newsreporting; and (2)
were commercial. 6 1 The Court noted that newsreporting generally
constitutes fair use, but found that in this case Nation Enterprises
went beyond reporting news because its scoop of a rival magazine was
in fact the news event.6 2 Nation Enterprises argued that newsreporting
is not strictly a commercial endeavor. 63 In response, the Court stated
that the focus of the distinction between non-profit and commercial
behavior is "whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price." 64
The Court then looked at the second factor of section 107, the
nature of the work, which in this case was an "unpublished historical
narrative or autobiography."65 Fair use is generally applicable to such
works because of the societal interest in disseminating factual works.6 6
However, in this case, the Court found that Nation Enterprises went
beyond merely reporting the facts contained in the memoirs and in-
stead captured "the author's individualized expression [s].1"67 Addi-
tionally, because the memoirs were previously unpublished, the
copyright holder's right of first publication was violated.68
59. See 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Harper & Row I].
60. See Harper & Row Ilf, 471 U.S. at 569. But see, Wright v. Warner Books, Inc. 953
F.2d 731, 736-37 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that author's minimal use of unpublished
sources for biography was a fair use).
61. See Harper & Row Il, 471 U.S. at 561-62. The Court also considered Nation Enter-
prises' conduct, pointing out that Nation Enterprises did not act in good faith in exploit-
ing the manuscript it was not authorized to possess. See id. at 562. "Fair use distinguishes
between a true scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal profit." Id. at 563
(internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
62. See id. at 561.
63. See id at 562. Commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively a violation
of the copyright holder's rights. See Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
64. Harper & Row III, 471 U.S. at 562 (citations omitted).
65. Id at 563.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 564. "The right of first publication encompasses not only the choice
whether to publish at all, but also the choices of when, where, and in what form first to
publish a work." Id. It is a concept that can underlie fair use analysis. See Kenneth D. Crews,
Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1,
66-67 (1999). The right of first publication is a common law doctrine that allows "authors
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The Court also found that the third factor, the amount copied,
weighed against a finding of fair use. The Court was not swayed by
Nation Enterprises' relatively minimal use of copyrighted material in
the article. 69 The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's con-
clusion that the parts of the manuscript quoted by Nation Enterprises
were "essentially the heart of the book."70
The Court's analysis of the fourth factor, market effects, also pre-
cluded a finding of fair use. In examining Nation Enterprises' actions
for the effect on the market, the Court looked at the effect of these
actions on the contract between Harper & Row and Time Magazine.
Because the agreement specified that Time would have exclusive rights
to prepublication, Time refused to pay Harper & Row.71 The Court
concluded that Nation Enterprises "adversely affect[ed] the potential
market for the copyrighted work."72
b. Analysis
The Supreme Court has not ruled on a case that directly involves
the fair use defense as it applies to the Internet, however, the Court's
analysis in Harper & Row can be analogized to digital issues. In today's
environment, scooping a rival probably entails being the first to re-
lease the information on a web site. 73 A court's analysis would likely
mirror the analysis in Harper & Row. Furthermore, it would likely be
difficult to prevail with a fair use defense because of the speed and
scope of distribution over the Internet. Since materials can quickly be
distributed worldwide, electronic access and distribution would
quickly erase any future market potential.
of unpublished works to prevent unauthorized distribution of their works." Michael J.
Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the DigitalAge, 67 FoRDHA" L. Rv. 1025, 1042
n.59 (1998) (citation omitted).
69. See Harper & Row III, 471 U.S. at 565. Approximately 300 of the 2,500 words in
The Nation's article were quotes of the author's original language. See id. at 548.
70. Harper & Row Ill, 471 U.S. at 565 (citation omitted).
71. See id, at 542-43.
72. Id. at 568 (quoting Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 451(1984)) (emphasis omitted).
73. For example, after Newsweek magazine decided not to publish its scoop on the
fact that Kenneth Starr was investigating the relationship between President Clinton and
Monica Lewinsky, rival Matt Drudge broke the story on his web site. SeeJonathan Karl, How
He Got that Stoiy, WALL ST, J., Apr. 1, 1999, at A20; Dennis Persica, Tripped Newsweek Reporter
Michael Isikoff Replays Linda Tripp's Pivotal Role in Almost Bringing Down the President, THE
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 6, 1999, at D7.
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3. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.74
a. Facts and Decision
Acuff-Rose Music sued 2 Live Crew, a musical group, for 2 Live
Crew's song "Pretty Woman," a parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman," origi-
nally written and recorded by Roy Orbison.75 Acuff-Rose claimed the
recording constituted copyright infringement and 2 Live Crew as-
serted the fair use defense. 76 The district court granted summary
judgment for 2 Live Crew,77 but the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding
that the commercial use of the song precluded its fair use.78 The
Supreme Court ruled for 2 Live Crew, stating that the Sixth Circuit's
emphasis on the commercial nature of the parody was in error.79
The crux of the issue before the Court was whether the commer-
cial nature of the parody prevented a finding of fair use. 80 In its analy-
sis of the purpose and character of the use, the Court focused on
whether 2 Live Crew's version of the song was meant to supplant the
original. In other words, was "Pretty Woman" transformative-did it
add something new-or was it an attempt by the infringer to "avoid
the drudgery in working up something fresh."81 The significance of
this aspect of the analysis is that the more an allegedly infringing work
differs from the original, the less significant other factors become-in
this case, the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's parody.82 The Court
74. 510 U.S. 569 (1994) [hereinafter Campbell III].
75. See Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 572. For a side by side comparison of the lyrics of each
song and a brief sample of the recording, see The Copyright Website (visited Aug. 12, 1999)
<http://www.benedict.com/audio/crew/crew.htm>.
76. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1152 (M.D. Tenn.
1991) [hereinafter Campbell 1].
77. See id.
78. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992) [here-
inafter Campbell II].
79. See Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 594.
80. See id, at 571-72.
81. Id at 580. The Court discussed the meaning and characteristics of parody, stating
that a critical element is criticism of the original. See id. at 582. "[A] work with [a] slight
parodic element and extensive copying will be more likely to merely 'supersede the ob-
jects' of the original." Id. at 582 n.16 (citations omitted). The Court stated that "[t]he
threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic charac-
ter may reasonably be perceived." Id. at 582. Once that threshold was met, the Court ex-
pressly declined to comment on the quality of the parody. See id.
82. See i& at 579. The Court found that 2 Live Crew's version could reasonably be
considered as comment or criticism of the original. See id. at 583. The Court stated that:
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true,
with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal
responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the naivet6 of the
original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness
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found that the Sixth Circuit erred by putting too great an emphasis on
the commercial nature of the parody.83 Section 107 gives examples84
of some of the purposes where fair use applies,85 and all of these uses
are generally commercial. 86 The fact that 2 Live Crew's parody served
a commercial purpose cannot be a presumption against fair use, just
as a noncommercial use would not protect an infringer from liabil-
ity.8 7 The Court reiterated that no presumption could be drawn based
on the commercial nature of the allegedly infringing work.8 8 Instead,
commerciality is only one factor to be weighed in conjunction with all
other section 107 factors. 89
The second factor discussed by the Court was the nature of the
copyrighted work.90 Although Orbison's song was the type of expres-
sion intended to be protected by copyright, this factor was of little
relevance to the case because parody, by definition, will almost always
require copying from the original piece.91
The third factor considered by the Court was the amount copied
and, specifically, the nature of parody.92 Parody requires a recogniza-
ble element from the original so that the audience is aware of the
comparison the artist is attempting to draw.93 The Sixth Circuit found
that this factor weighed against 2 Live Crew because the opening
words and music copied were the "heart" of the original song.94 The
Supreme Court disagreed on the ground that if 2 Live Crew had not
used the most memorable feature of the original, it was questionable
whether the parody would have been recognized. 95 Furthermore, af-
ter reproducing the words and music that open Orbison's version, 2
of street life and the debasement that it signifies. It is this joinder of reference
and ridicule that marks off the author's choice of parody from the other types of
comment and criticism that traditionally have had a claim to fair use protection as
transformative works.
Id. at 583.
83. See id. at 583-84.
84. See id. at 584. These examples are not intended to be considered an exhaustive
list.
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
86. See Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 583-84.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 585.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 586.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 588-89.
93. See id. at 588.
94. See id. at 587 (citing Campbell II, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992)).
95. See id. at 586-89.
[Vol. 34
Live Crew vastly changed them. Therefore, the Court concluded this
factor weighed in favor of 2 Live Crew.96
The Court found that the fourth factor, market effects, also
weighed in favor of 2 Live Crew.9 7 In determining the effect of the
parody on the potential market for the copyrighted work, the Court
pointed to the different market functions served by an original work
and its parody.98 However, the Court found fault in both parties for
not addressing the possible effect the 2 Live Crew version could have
on the potential market for derivative works.99 In other words, did 2
Live Crew's rap parody destroy the potential for Acuff-Rose to record
a non-parody rap version?
b. Analysis
The most significant aspect of the Court's ruling is the affirma-
tion of the proposition that commercial use does not presumptively
rule out fair use. 10 0 Setting aside for a moment the parody aspect of
Campbell, the decision could be relevant to an individual who uses mu-
sic obtained from the Internet to make a new work. For an individual
with the ability and the equipment, the Internet provides a cornuco-
pia of musical samples and pirated songs waiting to be copied and
manipulated. If, for example, a pirated copy of Orbison's "Oh, Pretty
Woman" was found on the Internet, it is technically possible to save it
to a disk. Once digitized, it is then possible to isolate certain parts of
the song-to only hear the guitar or to hear everything but the vocals.
At this point, the user can manipulate the recording, add new music
to it, and create a new work. While this process would certainly consti-
tute copyright infringement, Campbell opens a door, albeit a small one,
through which to escape a charge of infringement.
III. Different Mediums on the Internet
The Internet contains a wealth of copyrighted material. The digi-
tal nature of the Internet allows for easy copying, and thus easy copy-
right infringement. This section looks at four mediums that comprise
a majority of copyrighted material on the Internet: text, images,
96. See id. at 589. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the
copied portion of the bass guitar riff was excessive. See id.
97. See id. at 594.
98. See id. at 590-91.
99. See id. at 593-94.
100. See id. at 594.
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software, and music. These mediums were selected because of their
broad representation of Internet content.
A. Text
Copyrighted text is found on the Internet in the form of books,
newspapers, magazines, or webzines-to name only a few. The In-
ternet is a tremendous marketing tool for book authors because many
sites, with permission from the author or publisher, will make the first
chapter available on a web site as a way to promote the book and
increase sales.10 1 Additionally, there are over 1,000 print newspapers
that maintain Internet sites containing online versions of their news-
stand editions. 10 2 Magazines that up until now were sold by subscrip-
tion or at newsstands are accessible online,10 3 as are webzines that
exist only in electronic form on the Internet. 0 4
Because of the ease with which text can be copied on the In-
ternet, all of the above sources are ripe for duplication. While it is
permissible to download text for personal, noncommercial use, text
can easily be used in a way that violates a copyright holder's rights. For
example, a user could simply download the first chapter from several
books 0 5 and sell them as a compilation. Or the text could be copied
and included in another commercial publication. Of course, such be-
havior was possible before. the Internet, but at such significantly
greater costs as to make it inefficient.
Along with copying text that is already available on the web,
through the Internet a document can quickly and easily be distributed
to a limitless number of readers. While this use is desirable when
someone intends to disseminate information that unprotected by
101. See Chapter One (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
style/books/features/chapone.htm>; Today's Books (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://
www.msnbc.com/news/TODAYBOOKS-front.asp>.
102. See US Newspaper Links (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.usnewspaperlinks.
com/>. A typical disclaimer states that all materials are copyrighted and that "[y]ou may
not modify, copy, reproduce, republish, upload, post, transmit or distribute in any way any
material from this site including code and software. You may download material from this
site for your personal, non-commercial use only, provided you keep intact all copyright and
other proprietary notices." Tennessean.com (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://
www.tennessean.com/terms/>.
103. See Modern Drummer Online (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.moderndrummer.
com/>; Popular Mechanics (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://popularmechanics.com/>.
104. See Aphelion: The Webzine of Science Fiction and Fantasy (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http:/
/www.aphelion-webzine.com/index2.htm>; blast@explode.com (visited Aug. 12, 1999)
<http://www.explode.com/>.
105. See supra note 101.
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copyright, 10 6 the speed and scope of the Internet make it difficult to
stop the spread of information.
1. Religious Technology Center v. Lerma'0 7
a. Facts and Decision
Perhaps the most significant case involving the fair use defense by
an individual user is Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, currently the
only case to discuss the relevant issue here-copyright infringement
by an individual user on the Internet. In Lerma, Religious Technology
Center sued Lerma for copyright infringement after Lerma uploaded
portions of text copyrighted by, and sacred to, the Church of
Scientology.10 8 Lerma admitted to copying and posting the materials
on the Internet, but argued that his actions were a fair use of the
materials. 109 The court ruled for Religious Technology Center on its
motion for summary judgment. 110
The court first addressed Lerma's argument that the unique na-
ture of the Internet required the court to frame its evaluation consid-
ering the "special context of modern communication on the
Internet.""' The court stated:
While the Internet does present a truly revolutionary advance,
neither Congress nor the courts have afforded it unique status
under the fair use standard of § 107. The law of copyright has
evolved with technological change, with each new technological
106. One of the first attempts to disseminate a document on a worldwide scale over the
Internet had mixed results. In Commonwealth v. Louise Woodward, No. Crim. 97-0433, 1997
WL 694119 (Mass. Super. Nov. 10, 1998), Judge Hiller B. Zobel intended to release his
decision reducing the second-degree murder conviction of a British au pair to involuntary
manslaughter over the Internet at the same time he issued it in court. This high profile
case sparked media attention from around the world. The judge's intentions were
thwarted by a local power outage. Once the decision was posted on about 25 web sites,
heavy traffic caused many of the sites to crash. See Pamela Ferdinand, Judge Reduces Verdict,
Frees Au Pair; Murder Conviction Cut to Manslaughter, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1997, at A01;
Internet Press Service (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.ipsnews.com/nanny/>. The next
large-scale attempt at distribution came about 10 months later with the release of the Starr
Report. This 453 page document was released on the Internet through many commercial
and government sites, which helped spread out the traffic and keep glitches to a minimum.
See Linton Weeks & Leslie Walker, Required Reading; Millions Drawn Into the Web by Starr
Report, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 12, 1998, at E01.
107. No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131 (E.D.Va. Oct. 4, 1996).
108. See Lerma, 1996 WL 633131, at *1. This case provides an excellent example of the
difficulty a copyright holder has in protecting his rights. To view portions of these sacred
texts, see Scientology Secrets (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <# http://www.b-org.demon.nl/scn/up-
per-levels/00-upper-levels-index.html>.
109. See Lerma, 1996 WL 633131, at *4.
110. See id. at *1.
111. Id. at *4.
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advancement creating complicated questions of copyright interpre-
tation and application. Nevertheless, the new technologies-from
television, to video cassette recorders, to digitized transmissions-
have been made to fit within the overall scheme of copyright law
and to serve the ends which copyright was intended to promote.
The Internet is no exception, and postings on it must be judged in
reference to the already flexible considerations which fair use
affords.' 12
The court then proceeded to apply the four factors of section 107 to
the facts of the case.
In relation to the purpose and character of the use, Lerma ar-
gued that his actions fell into several of the categories set out in the
first paragraph of section 107.113 Specifically, he argued that since he
obtained the information from an open court record, his actions con-
stituted news reporting.1 14 The court rejected this argument because
Lerma's motives were not neutral and his intentions were not to bene-
fit the public. 1 5 The court also rejected Lerma's argument that he
was a scholar because scholarship does not permit "wholesale copying
and republication of copyrighted material," and Lerma added very lit-
tle quantitatively in the way of commentary or analysis to the post-
ings.1 16 Lerma also argued that since his use was not commercial, it
was fair. 1 7 The court determined that while the commercialism of the
use is significant, it is not controlling. 118 Commercialism is only one
factor to be considered and here it was outweighed by Lerma's mo-
tives.' 1 9 The court's analysis of the second factor, the nature of the
copyrighted work, also fell against Lerma. 20
112. Id. (citation omitted).
113. See id. at *5. The categories in the statute are "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research." 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1994). While there is no bright-line rule that a use that falls into one of these
categories is a fair use, "'[t] here is a strong presumption that factor one favors the defend-
ant if an allegedly infringing work fits the description of uses described in section 107.'"
Lerma, 1996 WL 633131, at *5 (quoting Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736
(2d Cir. 1991).
114. See Lerma, 1996 WL 633131, at *5.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at *6.
118. See id. (quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 109 (2nd Cir. 1992)).
119. See id.
120. See id. at *8. The court's analysis, though interesting, is of little relevance to the
Internet nature of the case. Briefly, the court discussed the difference in copyright protec-
tions in factual works versus expressive works and noted the difficulty in classifying these
works. Although the factual nature of the work favored Lerma, the unpublished nature of
the work and the Church of Scientology's repeated efforts to keep them unpublished,
tipped the balance for Religious Technology Center. See id. at *6-*8.
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Regarding the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the
copying, the court stated that although Lerma did not copy the entire
text, the subparts that he did copy were considered "single works" pro-
tected by copyright. 121 Lerma again argued for consideration of the
postings in light of the nature of the Internet. He argued that because
commentary and analysis by other users later accompanied the post-
ings, the "single works" should be "considered within the context of
the ongoing dialogue he has conducted on the newsgroup."'122 The
court rejected this argument in part because the commentary would
not necessarily be seen in conjunction with the infringing postings.123
Lastly, the court considered the effect on the potential market for
the copyrighted work.124 Because of the speculative nature of Reli-
gious Technology Center's evidence of harm, such as the inability of
the Church of Scientology to gain new members, and its failure to
show that Lerma was acting as a competitor, the court concluded that
the fourth factor weighed in favor of Lerma.125 However, this single
factor, even though frequently cited as the most important factor in
fair use analysis, was not enough for Lerma to prevail on a fair use
defense.' 26
b. Analysis
In light of Lerma, any user that uploads copyrighted material to a
web site-will have several obstacles to overcome in order to prevail on
a fair use defense. The Lerma court, like courts before it, refused to
change its fair use analysis because of new technology. Rather, the
court deferred to Congress's legislative function to broaden, or nar-
row, the fair use defense.
Potential liability exists if a user scans copyrighted text into his
computer and then uploads it to a web site or uses the materials for
other purposes. For example, there is a vast amount of copyrighted
text online in the form of newspapers, magazines, and creative works.
A user that copies any of these materials to his own site may be liable,
especially if he removes the copyright notice. 127
121. See id. at *10.
122. Id.
123. See id. The court stated that Lerma's argument would still allow for "blatant theft
of a copyright." Id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at *10-*11.
126. See id. at *11.
127. See Weiskopf, supra note 28, at 30 n.133.
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B. Images
Images can be found on the Internet in the form of computer-
generated graphics, photographs, or video. Similar to text files,
images on a web page can easily be copied. 128 While it has been possi-
ble since the photocopier to reproduce copyrighted pictures, the In-
ternet allows for simple, virtually cost-free reproduction, with no
decrease in quality. While there are sites that explicitly allow a user to
copy and reuse images posted on the site, 129 many sites-especially
those that are corporate or commercially driven-have pictures that
are likely to be more attractive to a web site designer.130
The ease with which a user can acquire copyrighted work points
to the likelihood of potential copyright infringement claims against
individual users that copy images to their site, either from images
scanned into a computer or from images copied from another web
site. The two cases that follow discuss private user infringement.13 1
1. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena13 2 and Marobie-FL, Inc. v.
National Ass'n of Fire Equipment Distributors1 33
a. Facts and Decisions
(1) Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. ("Playboy") sued Frena for copyright in-
fringement after Playboy discovered a bulletin board service ("BBS")
operated by Frena which contained copies of 170 photographs copy-
righted by Playboy.134 In granting Playboy's motion for summaryjudg-
128. While copyright notices are generally not imprinted on the photo, nearly all sites
contain notices on the home page stating that all images and content are copyrighted. See,
e.g., Stock Boston (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.stockboston.com/>. It is difficult to
find a site more protective of its graphics than Kraft foods. The bottom of Kraft's site
contains a link titled "A message from our lawyers." Kraft Interactive Kitchen (visited Aug. 12,
1999) <http://www.kraft.com/index.cgi>.
129. See Media Link (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.erinet.com/cunningl/
dales.html>.
130. See, e.g., Life (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.pathfinder.com/Life/>; Rolling
Stone (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://rollingstone.tunes.com/sections/gallery/text/
gallerycovers.asp?afl=.>.
131. In the first case, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D.
Fla. 1993), the provider was the operator of the bulletin board service. In Marobie-FL, Inc.
v. National Ass'n of Fire Equipment Distributors, 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1997),
the administrator was the person in charge of and responsible for the web site.
132. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
133. 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
134. See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
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ment, the court stated that Frena violated Playboy's right to display its
copyrighted works. 135
The court rejected Frena's fair use defense on several grounds.
First, Frena's use was commercial because he charged a fee for access
to the BBS.' 3 6 Second, the nature of the work was entertainment,
which led the court to find that fair use was not appropriate. 3 7 Third,
in its analysis regarding the amount of the copyrighted material used,
the court noted that the photographs were an "essential part of the
copyrighted work." 38 The court found that this third factor weighed
against Frena because he took a "very important part of [Playboy's]
copyrighted publications."' 39 Fourth, the court looked at the effect of
Frena's actions. 140 The court quickly concluded it was obvious that
Frena's conduct would harm the market for Playboy's product, thus
depriving Playboy of "considerable revenue to which it is entitled for
the service it provides."' 41 Frena argued this was fair use because the
commercial use was insignificant. 142 The court disagreed, stating that
the detrimental market effects combined with the commercial use ne-
gated the fair use defense.' 43 Therefore, the court ruled against
Frena's fair use defense, even though he may have been unaware that
Playboy had copyrights to the photographs. 144
(2) Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equipment Distributors
Marobie sued the National Association of Fire Equipment Distrib-
utors ("NAFED") for copyright infringement after NAFED uploaded
copies of "clip art" created by Marobie onto NAFED's web site, thus
making it available to everyone with access to the site. 45 Marobie had
valid copyrights for the clip art and the court found that by placing
the software on the web site, NAFED violated Marobie's right to repro-
duction and distribution.146 The court rejected NAFED's fair use de-
135. See id. at 1556-57.
136. See id. at 1558.
137. See id.
138. Id. The court clarified that it did not intend to imply that people did not also read
the articles. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1558.
141. Id. at 1559.
142. See id. at 1559.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Marobie-FL v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1172
(N.D. Il1. 1997).
146. See id.
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fense and granted Marobie summary judgment on its infringement
claim. 147
As to the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the
court stated that even though NAFED was a non-profit organization,
this fact did not control the question of whether NAFED's conduct
was commercial in nature.1 48 "The crux of the profit/nonprofit dis-
tinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price."1 49 Because the web
page used by NAFED served a commercial purpose-promoting the
association and advertising-its character was commercial. 150 Further-
more, the software was not uploaded for the purpose of "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research."1 51 The
second factor, the nature of the work, also weighed in favor of
Marobie since the software was creative in nature.1 52 NAFED's argu-
ment for the amount copied was that it had only copied three of the
seven volumes of clip art-not a substantial amount.15 The court re-
jected this argument, noting that each volume was copyrighted as an
independent work. 154 Lastly, the court found that NAFED's uploads
could be a "market substitute" for the copyrighted work and therefore
could harm the market and value of the work.155
b. Analysis
While neither Frena nor Marobie dealt with liability for a user that
accessed the infringing materials, it is possible to extrapolate from
these decisions the path a court might take should such a fact situa-
tion arise. Imagine the user that visits a site with pirated photographs
147. See id. at 1176.
148. See id. at 1175.
149. Id. (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. National Enters.; 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985)).
150. See id.
151. Id. at 1175-76.
152. See id. at 1176. NAFED argued that because outside images and drawings were
used in the creation of the clip art, it was factual rather than creative. The court disagreed,
in part because the images were edited, colored, and organized. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565
(1985) ("[N]o plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did
not pirate") (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.
1936)).
155. See Marobie, 983 F. Supp. at 1176.
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from a magazine. Simply viewing156 or downloading the images could
constitute copyright infringement. Furthermore, the user could be lia-
ble for infringement regardless of whether he knows he is download-
ing copyrighted materials. 15 7
The ability of a private user to succeed with a fair use defense
would depend on what the user did with the materials after download-
ing them. There are several likely scenarios as to how the images
could be used in a digital environment. These include downloading
for personal use, copying the images to a personal web site, e-mailing
them to other users, or modifying them for a different use. The fol-
lowing examines how fair use might apply to these situations.
For example, if an image is saved for later viewing, although tech-
nically this could be copyright infringement, it is probable that fair
use would apply.158 Once the user begins to copy the images for any
other purpose, however, a fair use defense becomes harder to estab-
lish. For example, if a user copied an image from one site to his own,
several issues are raised. First, this use would not fall into the tradi-
tional categories where copying is justified.1 59 Furthermore, in deter-
mining the character of the use, the court would have to perform its
analysis within the context of the user's web site. For instance, copying
an image of a Ford truck 160 to an individual's personal site in order to
demonstrate the user's interest in automobiles satisfies both elements
of copyright infringement.' 6 1 In determining whether the use was
156. Anytime an image is viewed on a web page a "copy" is made on the user's hard
drive. Unless additional steps are taken to save the image, the copy will be stored temporar-
ily in the computer's Random Access Memory, but will be erased when the computer is
turned off. The courts and Congress have grappled with whether this process constitutes
copying. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
157. See Lipton v. The Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Fitzgerald
Publ'g Co. v. Baylor Publ'g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir. 1986)) ("[1]ntent or knowl-
edge is not an element of infringement."); Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., Inc., 983 F.2d 824,
829 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The defendant's intent is simply not relevant: The defendant is liable
even for 'innocent' or 'accidental' infringements."); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.
Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) ("Intent or knowledge is not an element of infringe-
ment, and thus even an innocent infringer is liable . . ").
158. It is not unusual for a site to state in its legal disclaimer that downloading is per-
mitted only for personal use. See, e.g., Victoria's Secret (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://
www.victoriassecret.com/vsc/index.html> (stating "You may download or copy text, photo-
graphs, images, video, and audio contained in this site for your personal use only").
159. These uses are "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research .... " 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
160. Ford Motor Company (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www2.ford.com/> (warning
that "[t]hese materials may not be copied for commercial use or distribution, nor may
these materials be modified or reposted to other sites").
161. See supra Part II.A.
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commercial, the court would need to consider whether the user's site
hosted advertising of its own and whether the site sought to sell mer-
chandise or recruit individuals. As seen in Marobie, a site hosted by a
non-profit group can still be deemed to serve a commercial pur-
pose. 162 The type of image copied would also be relevant to a court's
analysis. Generally, work classified as fiction or fantasy, as opposed to
factual, will receive greater copyright protection. Therefore', a fair use
defense is less likely to succeed. 163 Entertainment is classified as fic-
tion or fantasy and thus falls into the category of works given greater
copyright protection.1 64 Similarly, creative works are given greater
copyright-and thus less fair use-protection.1 65 Therefore, a non-
factual image copied to a commercial site will surely fail to satisfy the
fair use defense.
C. Software
Given that the Internet is a computerized entity, built upon com-
plex computer programs, and owing its function to dense codes, it is
not surprising that software is one of the mediums frequently pirated
on the Internet. As with any file, software is easily uploaded or
downloaded to Or from the Internet. Courts have dealt with several
cases that involve copyright infringement caused by downloading
software through the Internet. Because of the immense focus on tech-
nology in these cases, they are significant precedents.
1. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHA 166
a. Facts and Decision
Sega sued Chad Sherman, among others, for copyright infringe-
ment.1 67 Sherman was the system operator for MAPHIA, an electronic
BBS. 168 MAPHIA contained copies of video games produced by
Sega. 169 Users paid a fee to access the BBS and also had to purchase a
162. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
163. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993); see also
Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property
Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 833 (1998) ("Under copyright law, although potentially
an open forum use, all Internet postings are shrouded under copyright property protection
given to the person creating the message, image or the like").
164. See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1558.
165. See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167,
1175-76 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
166. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).




"copier" that allowed the pirated game to, be played after it was
downloaded. 170 The court did not hold Sherman liable for direct in-
fringement because Sega did not show he copied files himself or di-
rectly caused any files to be copied.171 However, the court found
Sherman liable for contributory infringement.172 The court rejected
Sherman's fair use defense and granted Sega summary judgment on
its infringement claim.173
The court found that all four fair use factors weighed against
Sherman. 174 First, Sherman's use was commercial. He encouraged
downloads so that customers would have to purchase one of his copi-
ers. 175 The creative nature of the games and the fact that the entire
game was copied also weighed against Sherman. 176 Third, the court
found that even if the use of Sherman's copiers was small, "un-
restricted and widespread conduct of this sort would result in a sub-
stantial adverse impact on the market for the Sega games."'1 77
b. Analysis
Although MAPHA dealt with infringement by a BBS and not an
individual user, the court's analysis serves as a guide to whether an
individual user could have been found liable for downloading games
from MAPHIA. Sherman argued that he could not be liable for con-
tributory infringement unless the users were liable for direct infringe-
ment. 78 He argued that since the games were used only for in-home
entertainment and were not distributed further, the conduct of the
users was fair. 179 The court stated that "[i]f the users' actions consti-
170. See id. at 929.
171. See id. at 932. Therefore, Sega failed to prove copying, the second element of
copyright infringement. The court pointed to Religious Technology Center v. Netcomm
On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995), where the
defendant Internet Service Provider was found not liable for direct infringement because
the system was used to make a copy-defendant did not make the copies himself. See
Netcomm. 907 F. Supp. at 1371.
172. See MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. at 936. The court stated that liability for other than
direct infringement would be proper if Sega showed that the BBS users directly infringed
Sega's copyright and that with knowledge of the infringing activity, Sherman "induced,
caused, or materially contributed to their infringing activity." Id. at 932.
173. See id. at 936.
174. See id. at 934-36.
175. See id. at 934. The copiers sold for $350 and download fees ran from $35 a month
to $500 for unlimited use. See id. at 929, 935. Individual games from Sega cost between $30
to $70. See id. at 935.
176. See id. at 934-35.
177. Id. at 935.
178. See id. at 934.
179. See id. at 933.
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tute fair use, they will not be considered direct infringers. Then, Sher-
man cannot be contributorily liable because contributory
infringement requires direct infringement by someone."180 The court
evaluated the conduct of the users in conjunction with Sherman's de-
fense. 18 ' Although there was no evidence that the games were
downloaded for commercial purposes, downloading eliminated the
need to purchase the game from Sega.18 2 This purpose, according to
the court, weighed against fair use.1 8 3 Another factor weighing against
the user's fair use was that each download contained essentially the
entire copyrighted work. 184 Fiially, after downloading the file, the
user could make additional copies, which could then potentially be
distributed. 8 5 The entire range of conduct erased the need for a user
to purchase the game from Sega, thereby reducing Sega's market.18 6
The factors that led the court to conclude MAPHIA's users were
liable for direct infringement, and consequently that Sherman was lia-
ble for contributory infringement, would be identical in nearly any
case where software was improperly posted on the Internet. There are,
however, two significant exceptions where fair use has been success-
fully used in cases involving copyright infringement of software.18 7
Although these cases did not involve software downloaded from the
Internet, they are discussed below for two primary reasons. First, both
cases involve video games which are representative of the kinds of
software likely to be pirated and downloaded from the Internet.18 8
Second, their analyses and holdings can be analogized to conduct
often found on the Internet.




184. See id. at 935.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Sega Enters. Ltd., v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
188. Video games are manufactured for personal use, specifically entertainment, and
are more likely to be pirated, than, for example, an accounting program, which would be
purchased by a business and is therefore less likely to be pirated.
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2. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America'8 9 and Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.190
a. Facts and Decisions
(1) Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America
Plaintiff Nintendo produced video game cartridges that worked
in conjunction with a video game console, also produced by plain-
tiff.19 1 Defendant Galoob manufactured a device called the Game Ge-
nie.19 2 When this device was used in conjunction with plaintiff's game
and console it could alter features of the game by blocking and replac-
ing data exchanged between the cartridge and the console. 193 The
changes made by the Game Genie were not saved once the console
was turned off and the changes were not stored in the cartridge. 194
Nintendo sued, claiming the Game Genie violated Nintendo's copy-
right by creating a derivative work. 1 95 The district court held, and the
Ninth Circuit Court affirmed, that the Game Genie did not create a
derivative work and that even if it did, the work produced by the
Game Genie was protected as a fair use. 196 The court based its conclu-
sion on two things: (1) the fact that users of the Game Genie were
engaged in noncommercial activity; and (2) the published nature of
the games. 1 97 Furthermore, the circuit court analogized the Game Ge-
nie to the video tape recorders at issue in Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.'98 Just as the recorders were used by con-
sumers to watch shows at a more convenient, and thus more enjoyable
time, the Game Genie allowed users to have a more entertaining expe-
rience. 199 Nintendo failed to show that the Game Genie would harm
189. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
190. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
191. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967. The game console was called the Nintendo Entertain-
ment System. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. By inputting specific codes a player could, for example, increase the
amount of lives or the speed the character possessed. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 969. The circuit court compared the Game Genie to a spell-checking
program. See id. At the time of the case spell-checkers were developed and sold by a com-
pany different from the word-processor manufacturer and were integrated into the ex-
isting word processing software. See id.
197. See id. at 970-71.
198. See id. at 971.
199. See id.
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the market for future derivative works, despite Nintendo's claim that
it could "re-release altered versions of its game cartridges .... 200
(2) Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.
Defendant Accolade developed and manufactured video games
that could be played on a video game console marketed by plaintiff
Sega.20 1 Sega developed games for the console and sold licenses to
other software companies allowing development and production of
games that were compatible with Sega's console. 20 2 Without obtaining
a license, Accolade produced games that were compatible with Sega's
console. 203 Accolade's development process required it to reverse en-
gineer several Sega games to discover what was required to make its
games compatible with the Sega console.20 4 The games were analyzed
for their common features and these features were described in a
manual. 20 5 The manual only described the requirements to make the
games compatible with the Sega console; it did not list the actual
code. 206
The circuit court reversed the district court's issuance of a prelim-
inary injunction and held that Accolade's reverse engineering of
Sega's games was a fair use. 207 Regarding the purpose and character
of the use, the circuit court noted that Accolade's use was commercial,
but that the general presumption against a commercial use being a
fair use "can be rebutted by the characteristics of a particular commer-
200. Id. at 972. The district court and the circuit court were both skeptical of this asser-
tion. Both courts noted the fast pace which the industry moves and the lack of evidence by
Nintendo that any such releases were being considered. "While board games may never
die, good video games are mortal." Id. (quoting Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of
Am., Inc. 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1295 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).
201. See Sega Enters. Ltd., v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1992). The
game console was called Genesis. See id.
202. See id. The license included rights to Sega's copyrighted computer game code and
the SEGA trademark. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. Reverse engineering entails accessing the program's object code, which is
the machine-readable binary language and converting it to source code, the programming
language written by programmers and readable by humans. See id.
205. See id. at 1515.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 1514. Fair use was only one of four arguments raised by Accolade. The
circuit court rejected Accolade's remaining three arguments that copying was permissible:
(1) as intermediate copying; (2) because computer code is not protected by copyright; or
(3) under 17 U.S.C. § 117(1). See id. at 1517-20. Section 117(1) allows the owner to make a
copy if the "new copy or adaptation 'is created as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other man-
ner . . . .'" Id. at 1520 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 117(1)).
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cial use."208 In this case, the court considered that the copying done
by Accolade was conducted to understand how to make games com-
patible with the system and not to copy any of Sega's games. 209 Also,
under this factor the court stated that "we are free to consider the
public benefit resulting from a particular use notwithstanding the fact
that the alleged infringer may gain commercially."210 The court found
the increase in independent games created for the Sega console and
the creative effort required for those products were consistent with
the intended effect of copyright law.2 11 For the nature of the work, the
court discussed the difficulty in classifying computer programs as
either an idea, which is not granted copyright protection, or an ex-
pression, meaning the expression of the idea, which is granted copy-
right protection.21 2 The court concluded that denying fair use
applications of object code would essentially give the creator a "mo-
nopoly over the functional aspects of [the] work-aspects that were
expressly denied copyright protection by Congress."213 Therefore, this
factor also weighed in favor of Accolade.214 The amount copied
weighed in favor of Sega because Accolade copied the entire pro-
gram. 215 However, this factor was given little weight, in light of the fact
that Accolade's end product made little use of the copied materials.216
The Sega court next considered the effect Accolade's copying had on
Sega's product market. The court stated that Accolade's games were
different from Sega's and, given the nature of the video game market,
it would not be unreasonable for a consumer to purchase, for exam-
ple, a football game produced by each company.217 The court recog-
nized that Sega may suffer an economic loss from the competition,
but characterized the loss as "minor."218 Moreover, by furthering crea-
tive expression, Accolade's use was consistent with the intent of copy-
right law.2 1 9
208. Id. at 1522. The court stated that the commercial aspect of Accolade's use was of
"minimal significance." Id. at 1523.
209. See id. at 1522.
210. Id. at 1523 (citations omitted).
211. See id.
212. See id. at 1524.
213. Id. at 1526; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1995).
214. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 1526-27.
217. See id. at 1523.
218. See id. at 1524.
219. See id.
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b. Analysis
Galoob and Accolade are examples of successful assertions of the
fair use defense. Although the software was not obtained over the In-
ternet, the courts' rationales are applicable given the ease with which
pirated software can be found on the Internet. If an individual user
downloads pirated software, even for personal use, success on a fair
use defense is unlikely. The user may succeed on the first factor con-
sidered by the court, the purpose and character of the use. However,
the nature of the work, the amount copied, and the market effects will
likely weigh against fair use. While there is some debate about the
strength of copyright protection for object code, the program as a
whole will be protected by copyright. Additionally, it is most likely that
the entire program will be downloaded, thus tipping factor three, the
amount copied, against the user. Finally, the downloading of pirated
software effects the market for the product. Even if the user does not
distribute the software to anyone else, this practice shrinks the con-
sumer base. A fair use defense will have a stronger chance of suc-
ceeding if the software is used for purposes other than supplanting
the need to purchase the product from the original manufacturer.
D. Music
Of the different electronic mediums discussed in this comment,
music has the least precedent in the area of fair use. The result is that
music is perhaps the medium where the largest amount of infringe-
ment occurs. 220 This is because consumers have long been accus-
tomed to recording songs from the radio or copying songs from one
source to another, such as from compact disk to cassette tape. How-
ever, it is important to note the legal and technological differences
between radio and the Internet. A radio station purchases the licens-
ing rights to a recording, enabling the station to broadcast the music
legally and compensate the artist.2 21 Currently, there are no universal
license agreements that apply to the Internet.222 This means that on-
line music providers must either negotiate individually with recording
artists or their labels, or simply neglect to secure these licenses at all.
220. See Rick Hepp, Cybermusic's Future May Not Be as Smooth as It Sounds, Cnii. TRIB., July
25, 1999, at 5.
221. See Buffalo Broad. Corp. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
546 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D. N.Y. 1982).
222. SeeJim Kirk, Performing Online: Music Licensing Debate Takes Center Stage, CH. SUN-
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at 51.
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This may result in the violation of the copyright holder's performance
and distribution rights.
It is unclear whether an individual user that downloads music, at
least from a legitimate site, is liable for copyright infringement. As-
suming that the site has negotiated a licensing agreement with the
copyright holder, infringement would not be an issue. However, if no
such license exists, the user-and certainly the provider-could face
potential liability. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992223 ("AHRA"), which was intended in part to
allow in-home noncommercial recording of copyrighted works with-
out possible liability, acts as a defense to downloading music from the
Internet.
1. Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc.224 and Recording Industry
Association of America, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
In. 2 25
a. Facts and Decisions
(1) Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc.
Frank Music involved a BBS administered by the ISP CompuServe,
through which users could upload and download copyrighted and pi-
rated recordings.2 26 Although the case settled before the court could
rule on CompuServe's liability, the case is often cited as an example of
the potential liability for copyright infringement involving music over
the Internet. 227 Under the court-approved settlement, CompuServe
agreed to pay $568,000 in damages and put in place a licensing agree-
ment that provided royalties to artists for any future use.228 Although
under The Copyright Act and The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
CompuServe would likely have been liable only for contributory in-
fringement, the suit is significant because CompuServe raised the
AHRA as an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's copyright infringe-
ment claim. 229
223. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994).
224. No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D. N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 1993; court approved settlement Dec.
19, 1995).
225. 29 F. Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
226. See Nancy A. Bloom, Protecting Copyright Owners of Digital Music-No More Free Access
to Cyber Tunes, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'x 179, 193 (1997).
227. As of May 2, 1999, a Westlaw search showed that 99 law review articles cited this
suit as a leading precedent in this area.
228. See Bloom, supra note 226, at 193.
229. See id.
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(2) Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Diamond
Multimedia Systems, Inc. 23 0
The AHRA was discussed more recently when plaintiff Recording
Industry Association of America ("RIAA") sought an injunction
against defendant Diamond Multimedia Systems ("Diamond") for the
upcoming distribution of the Rio PMP 300 ("Rio").231 The Rio is a
small, handheld device that can receive copies of audio files from a
computer's hard drive and store approximately sixty minutes of music
internally. 232 A removable memory card can also be purchased which
effectively doubles the playback capability of the Rio. 23 3 Although the
Rio does not have output capability, meaning it cannot copy music to
another source, the memory card can be used with any other Rio.234
The issue before the court was whether the Rio would be considered a
Digital Audio Recording Device ("recording device") under the
AHRA.235 Plaintiff argued that as a recording device, the Rio was sub-
ject to AHRA, requiring the manufacturer to pay royalties to plaintiff,
and that the Rio must incorporate Serial Copy Management System
("SCMS") technology in its design. 236 Plaintiff did not assert a poten-
tial copyright claim, because section 1008 of the AHRA exempts re-
cording devices from copyright violations. 237 However, the court
stated that if the Rio was not considered a recording device,
230. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the
Rio was not a digital audio recording device and therefore not subject to the AHRA. See
Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,1081 (9th
Cir. 1999). In reaching its decision, the court thoroughly discussed how MP3 technology
functions and the existence of music piracy on the Internet. See Diamond, 180 F.3d at
1073-74. Less than two months after the decision, the parties announced they had reached
an agreement to end the litigation. See The Cutting Edge Over Rio Portable MP3 Player Ends,
Los ANGELES TIMES, August 5, 1999, at C6. Future versions of the Rio will incorporate
SDMI, a cooperatively developed security system to prevent piracy or mass copying. See
James Lardner, The Record Industry Gives Peace a Chance, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
September 20, 1999, at 48.
231. See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. Assuming the cost of a memory card is less than the cost of a compact disk,
it would be efficient and inexpensive for a user to download music and build a collection
of memory cards.
235. See id. at 628.
236. See id. at 631-32. SCMS is intended to prevent a recording device from copying
"unauthorized, multigenerational copies of copyrighted digital audio recordings." John F.
Delaney et al., The Law of the Internet: A Summary of U.S. Internet Caselaw and Legal Develop-
ments, 545 PRAcrilsING L. INsT. 61, 112 (1999).
237. See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 627.
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"[d] efendant has a potential 'fair use' defense that might defeat any
primafacie showing of infringement."238 The court went on to say that:
Although the Rio will inevitably be used to record both legitimate
music (e.g., commercially available CDs) and illegitimate music
(e.g., copyrighted music illegally posted on the Internet), the ab-
sence of the SCMS information does not cause the illegitimate uses.
Even if the Rio did incorporate SCMS, a Rio user could still use the
device to record unauthorized MP3 files posted to the Internet.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs are injured through an illicit use
of the Rio, this is precisely the type of injury for which the royalty
provisions were adopted.239
In denying the injunction, the court stressed that the Rio was "capable
of recording legitimate digital music" and that the Rio had "signifi-
cant beneficial uses." 240
b. Analysis
The problem with copyright infringement of musical works is evi-
dent to Congress and the Judiciary. Given the nature of the music
industry and the sums of money involved, it is safe to say that the in-
dustry will do what it can to protect its interests. These efforts have
commenced on both technological and legal fronts.
Technologically, the development of devices that block unauthor-
ized reproductions are a first step toward stopping the seemingly un-
stoppable practice of bootlegging. The problem faced by the industry,
however, is that for every obstacle it puts in front of infringers, a
counter technology is soon developed to bypass the hurdle. Anticipat-
ing this conundrum, the industry put its support behind the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act,24 1 which, in part, prohibits the circumven-
tion of technological matters used to protect copyrighted materials.
How these matters will impact fair use defenses by individuals
downloading copyrighted music from the Internet remains to be seen.
Based on dicta from Diamond, it seems that courts are at least aware of
the problem. Additionally, the built-in royalty mechanisms for the de-
vices most likely to be used for legitimate and illegitimate copying pro-
vides a remedy for the copyright holder.
The oftentimes ephemeral nature of web sites provides the big-
gest obstacle for copyright holders. 242 In at least three cases filed in
238. Id.
239. Id. at 633.
240. Id.
241. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
242. See John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopian-
ism, 74 IND. L.J. 893, 926 (1999).
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the last two .years,243 a record company has initiated legal action
against web sites and bulletin boards based on the uploading and
downloading of copyrighted materials. 244 Each time, however, the de-
fendant's site disappeared from the Internet before plaintiff could
positively identify the site administrator. 245
While the music industry and Internet bootleggers will likely be
in a perpetual cat-and-mouse chase, the increasing ability to locate
and track infringers means that eventually a court will hear a case in-
volving an entrepreneur who performed one too many downloads.
There are several scenarios that are likely to exist, and given the case-
by-case application of fair use, the success of the defense will hinge on
the particular facts of the case.
The most likely scenario will involve downloads from a site that is
not licensed to distribute the music. While the site itself may be di-
rectly liable for at least violating reproduction and distribution rights,
the user of the site may too face liability. As stated before, if the user
does nothing more than listen to the songs for personal use, liability
will likely not attach. However, if the user transfers the files to another
medium, such as a cassette or compact disk, the user may have a hard
time overcoming any of the four fair use factors. Copying an entire
creative piece for commercial purposes, with the finished product
serving as a substitute for the original, is a tremendous burden to over-
come. Even if the user is not selling the downloaded music, but is
merely trading -or sending it to others, fair use is not likely to prevent
liability.
Another issue involving music downloaded from the Internet in-
volves sampling. This occurs when part of a song is used verbatim in
another song. This practice became widespread in the 1980's and is
now commonplace. Although some artists that use sampling obtain
licenses and permission to do so, others do not, thus creating infringe-
ment issues. 246 The Internet gives anyone with the necessary software
the ability to splice part of one work into his own. Once a piece of
243. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Internet Site Known as Fresh Kutz, No. 97-CV-1099 H
(JFS) (S.D. Cal. filed June 10, 1997); MCA Records Inc. v. Internet Site Known as ftp://
parsoft.com/MP3s/, No. 97-CV-1360-T (N.D. Tex. filed June 9, 1997); Sony Music En-
tertainment Inc. v. Internet Site Known as ftp://208.197.0.28, No. 97 Civ. 4245 (S.D. N.Y.
filed June 9, 1997).
244. See Delaney, supra note 236, at 87-89.
245. See id. at 89.
246. SeeJames P. Allen, Jr., Look What They've Done to My Song Ma -Digital Sampling in
the 90's: A Legal Challenge for the Music Industry, 9 U. MAii Err. & SPORTS L. REV. 179
(1992).
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music is downloaded, sampled, and put into another work, differentia-
tion in a court's analysis as to whether infringement exists, regardless
of the source of the music, is unlikely.
Initially, most artists did not believe it was necessary to seek per-
mission or authorization to sample from a copyrighted work. 247 After
the case of Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Records, Inc.,248
record companies and artists have generally acknowledged the neces-
sity of acquiring the rights to a work before sampling it. In Grand Up-
right, a musician released a song containing three sampled words
along with the underlying music after the copyright holder denied his
request to use the piece.249 The court held that the sample constituted
infringement and chastised the defendant for using the sample with
knowledge that a license was required.250 Similarly, in Jarvis v. A & M
Records, 25' where defendant was accused of sampling words and music
from the plaintiffs copyrighted work, the court denied defendant's
motion for summary judgment and equated sampling with stealing. 252
IV. Governmental Initiatives
A. United States
Drafting legislation responding to the proliferation of copyright
infringement on the Internet is problematic for several reasons. First,
the legislative process is not designed to respond quickly. Legislation
intended to respond to a cutting edge problem may be outdated by
the time it is enacted. Second, given the perceived lack of technologi-
cal knowledge within Congress, legislation in this area is even more
likely than most to be broad, ambiguous or both. Despite the inherent
247. See Don E. Tomlinson & Timothy Nielander, Unchained Melody: Music Licensing in
the Digital Age, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 277, 310 (1998).
248. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. N.Y. 1991).
249. See id at 184. The court did not seem to be open to the artistic side of sampling, or
any argument that sampling would not constitute infringement. The court stated:
'Thou shalt not steal' has been an admonition followed since the dawn of civiliza-
tion. Unfortunately, in the modern world of business this admonition is not al-
ways followed. Indeed, the defendants in this action for copyright infringement
would have this court believe that stealing is rampant in the music business and,
for that reason, their conduct here should be excused. The conduct of the de-
fendants herein, however, violates not only the Seventh Commandment, but also
the copyright laws of this country.
Id. at 183.
250. See id. at 185.
251. 827 F. Supp. 282, 295 (D. N.J. 1993).
252. See id. ( "[T]here can be no more brazen stealing of music than digital
sampling ....").
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obstacles in its way, Congress passed legislation intended to address
the issue. Whether the effect will foster the openness that has allowed
the Internet to thrive or begin to regulate the flow of ideas and crea-
tivity remains to be seen. The following provides an overview of signifi-
cant governmental initiatives that involve copyright infringement and
the Internet.
1. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") is the most re-
cent legislation intended to modify copyright law in the face of new
technologies. 253 The DMCA has two relevant titles.254 Title I imple-
ments two treatises from the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"). 255 The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty require signatory countries to give for-
eign copyrighted materials at least the same protections as domestic
copyrighted materials. Title I of the DMCA states, in part, that "[n] o
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively con-
trols access to a work protected under this title."25 6 This provision is
intended to prohibit users from disabling the mechanisms created to
block illegal access or copying. For example, music companies are de-
veloping digital watermarks which can be placed on digital record-
ings, to prevent second generation copies from being made.25 7 This
device, in theory, could prevent a user from downloading unlicensed
253. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct.
28,1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201); see also The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998:
U.S. Copyright Office Summary (visited May 12, 1999) <http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/legis-
lation/dmca.pdf>.
254. Title III involves copying software in conjunction with computer maintenance andTitle IV contains various miscellaneous provisions. Title V is the "Vessel Hull Design Pro-
tection Act." See id. Title V is a response to Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141 (1989), where the Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Florida Supreme
Court striking down a statute that prohibited "the direct molding process to duplicate
unpatented boat hulls." Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 144. Respondent essentially made a mold
of Petitioner's boat hull in order to make a competing product. See id. at 145. Petitioner
had not filed for a patent to protect the utility or design of the hull or the manufacturing
process. See id. at 144. The Court held that the Florida statute would have given "patent-
like" protection to the Petitioner and that "state regulation of intellectual property must
yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent laws."
Id. at 152.
255. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct.
28, 1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201).
256. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. 1999). This section does not become effective for two
years, while administrative rules are being written. See id.
257. See Barak D. Jolish, Scuttling the Music Pirate: Protecting Recordings in the Age of the
Internet, 17 ENT. & SPoRTs LAw, 9, 11 (1999).
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songs from a web site2 58 and provide some tracking capabilities. 259 Ti-
tle I also contains three prohibitions of products or technologies relat-
ing to circumvention.2 60 If the primary design or commercial
significance is for circumvention, or marketed for circumvention, it is
prohibited by the DMCA.261 Once this provision takes effect, and after
the copyrighted protection technologies are in place, access will be
significantly impaired. Instead of relying on a fair use defense, the
alleged infringer will have to defend himself for violating the DMCA.
Although the Act states that it is not intended to affect fair use, 2 6 2 by
cutting off access it seems that the anti-circumvention provisions are
in conflict with fair use.
Title II limits online service provider ("OSP") liability for the fol-
lowing activities.263 First, an OSP is not liable for "[t]ransitory digital
network communications." In other words, when infringing material
is routed through an OSP's network, the OSP is not liable for the copy
that the network automatically makes of the material.264 Second, the
Act removes potential liability for systems caching.265 This seems to
settle the debate as to whether the ubiquitous function of caching vio-
lates the copyrighted holder's rights. Third, an OSP is not liable for
storage of the user's infringing materials, provided that the OSP
meets certain statutory requirements. To avoid liability, the OSP: (1)
may not have knowledge of the infringing material; (2) may not re-
ceive financial benefit directly from the infringing material; and (3)
must expeditiously remove the infringing material, or prohibit access
to it.266 Fourth, under Title II, an OSP is not liable for having links to
infringing material, with similar knowledge, financial, and removal re-
258. See id.
259. See J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract With Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. Rv.
875, 897 & n.86 (1999).
260. Circumvention is defined as "to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an en-
crypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
measure, without the authority of the copyright owner. .. ." 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (3) (A).
261. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2) (A)-(C). Exceptions exist for libraries and colleges, re-
verse engineering, protection of minors, personal privacy, and security testing. See 17
U.S.C. § 1201(d), (f)-(j).
262. "Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to
copyright infringement, including fair use, under this tide." 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c) (1).
263. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. 1999).
264. The statute specifies that to avoid liability the OSP: cannot have initiated the
transmission; may not have selected the specific work for copying; did not select the recipi-
ents of the material; may not have made a permanent copy of the material; and did not
modify the content. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)-(5).
265. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b).
266. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C).
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quirements in place. 267 The statute specifies that if the OSP is liable
under any of the previous categories, all defenses, including fair use,
are available. 268
2. The Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights
The Information Infrastructure Task Force Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights, a group composed of experts within the
Executive Branch, published the final version of its report in 1995.269
The report, referred to as the White Paper, has been criticized by
some as endorsing a narrow view of fair use in relation to the In-
ternet.270 Others have stated the White Paper intended to "eliminate
fair-use rights whenever a use might be licensed." 271 Taking the report
at face value, it seems to advocate preserving the status quo, stating:
Preserving the framework [of copyright protection] does not re-
quire, however, a dramatic increase in author's rights, such as
more limited or no further applicability of the fair use doctrine in
the NII [National Information Infrastructure] environment....
The Working Group believes that weakening copyright owners'
rights in the NII is not in the public interest; nor would a dramatic
increase in their rights be justified.272
However, at least one member of the Working Group has publicly
stated that the White Paper did not go far enough in supporting fair
use for noncommercial uses. 27 3
B. European Union
The European Union ("E.U.") has made strides towards imple-
menting new laws governing the Internet and intellectual property.274
Recent proposals focus on audio and visual materials and how to pro-
tect them from illegal distribution over the Internet.275 However, it is
267. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
268. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(l).
269. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Information Infrastructure Task Force, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
270. SeeJames Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10 HARv.
J.L. & TECH. 47, 52 (1996).
271. Weiskopf, supra note 28, at 42 n.220.
272. WHITE PAPER, supra note 269, at 17.
273. See Barry D. Weiss, Barbed Wires and Branding in Cyberspace: The Future of Copyright
Protection, 450 PRACTISING L. INST. 397, 408 (1996) (citing Bruce A. Lehman, Remarks at
Conference on "The On Line Services Industry: Today and Tomorrow" (May 6, 1996)).
274. See E. U. Parliament Will Soon Release Draft Copyright Law Revisions, 9 NO. 12 J. PRO-
PRIETARY RTS. 26, 26 (Dec. 1997).
275. See id. One area where the E.U. is breaking ground involves rights of privacy on
the Internet. SeeJonathan D. Hart et al., Cyberspace Liability, 523 PRACTISING L. INST. 123,
[Vol. 34
FAIR USE ON THE INTERNET
clear that similar debates-such as striking the appropriate balance
between protection and access to protected works-exist in the Euro-
pean realm as well. 2 76 A recent draft directive seeks to prevent illegal
duplication of copyrighted materials through digital means and to
compensate artists for their work.27 7 The directive would impose a tax
on blank tapes and disks, similar to the tax already imposed by all
states except Britain, Ireland, and Luxembourg. 278 Although the E.U.
is still working to harmonize copyright laws, 2 79 the current trend of
the European Court of Justice seems to be against broad copyright
protection. 280 This means that copyrighted materials may be given less
protection in Europe, increasing the likelihood of inconsistency be-
tween U.S. and European standards for determining what constitutes
infringement and what uses are acceptable. 281
Conclusion
The Internet has raised substantial new issues relating to copy-
right. As cases involving copyright infringement have entered the
courts, it has become common for parties, particularly defendants, to
argue that the nature of the Internet requires the court to apply a
different sort of analysis to their case. This approach has not been
successful. Instead, courts have done what they can to force new issues
into the current framework and, at the same time, let it be known it is
Congress's role to change copyright law in response to new
technology.
Currently, there has been no modification in the fair use doc-
trine, either by Congress or the courts. Instead, courts have continued
to analyze cases one at a time. The change that the Internet has
178 (1998); European Commission Paper Seeks Reform in Electronic Commerce, 10 NO. 7J. PROPRI-
ETARY RTS. 22, 22 (July 1998).
276. See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REv. 51, 76 (1997) (discussing attempts by some E.U. members to limit access for
private or research uses in the Copyright Directive).
277. See Charles Bremner, New Tax Fear Over Copyright Reforms, THE TIMES OF LONDON,
Feb. 11, 1999, at 13.
278. See id.
279. See Hayes, supra note 28, at 102.
280. See Frank Romano, International Conventions and Treaties, 536 PRACrISING L. INST.
545, 585 (1998) (stating that the court's decisions have "been critical toward copyright
and, as such, it has maintained its position against the monopolistic tendencies deemed to
be inherent in copyright law").
281. Copyright infringement occurring between countries also raises a myriad ofjuris-
dictional issues. See generally Christian M. Reider & Stacy C. Pappas, Personal Jurisdiction for
Copyright Infringement on the Internet, 38 SANTA CLARA L.REv. 367 (1998).
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brought is not a change in doctrine, but a change in issues. While
nearly all cases involve infringement by a provider or site administra-
tor, an increase in cases against individual users can be expected as
the technology continues to evolve.
Finally, although the last ten years have seen a substantial change
in how society interacts with technology, the current technological
revolution is not over, rather, it is just beginning. The technology that
shapes these issues is in its infancy. As technology continues to ad-
vance, it is likely that it will become more difficult to infringe a copy-
right over the Internet. Until then, it is likely that those who can do it
will-and those who get caught will plead fair use.
